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Abstract 
The present study examined a public goods dilemma under a selective play paradigm. 
In addition to understanding the determinants of cooperation behavior, I also 
explored preference for partners as influenced by endowment level, cooperation rate, 
the kind of information displayed, and social value orientation. Results indicated that 
high endowment individuals contributed more in absolute magnitude but 
proportionally less (relative to their endowment). Consistent with previous findings, 
prosocials contributed more than proselfs. When cooperation information was 
displayed, there was a higher cooperation level whereas a lower cooperation level 
was observed with the display of endowment information. For choice of partners, 
cooperators and high endowment individuals were more likely to be chosen as 
partners when cooperation and endowment information was displayed respectively. 
These results suggest that displaying cooperation information will help promote 
contribution while cooperators and higher endowment individuals are more popular 
as partners. It is also interesting to note the overshadowing effect of endowment 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
A pervasive aspect of social interaction is the conflict between maximizing 
personal interests and maximizing collective interests. In some situations, it is 
generally more profitable to maximize selfish interests, but if all choose to do so, all 
are worse off than if all choose to maximize group interests. Such situations are 
called social dilemmas (Komorita, Parks, & Hulbert, 1992; Orbell, Van de Kragt, & 
Dawes, 1988; Van Lange, Liebrand, & Kulhman, 1990; Yamagishi & Sato, 1986). 
One special type of social dilemma is a public good (PG). A public good is a 
product or service that can be enjoyed by all group members but its provision is 
dependent on their contribution (Komorita & Parks, 1994; Olson, 1965). Services 
provided by charities, programs broadcasted by public television stations, resources 
offered by libraries are examples of public goods. Given its widespread application 
in daily social situations, public good dilemmas are often research topics in the areas 
of economics, politics and social sciences. 
Public goods are chararterized by two features: jointness of supply and 
impossibility of exclusion. Jointness of supply means that the good cannot be used 
up regardless of the amount of consumption. Impossibility of exclusion refers to the 
notion that every group member can enjoy the good no matter whether (or how much) 
they have contributed (Komorita 8c Parks, 1994; Olson, 1965). In this way, an 
individual's rational choice is not to contribute since one cannot be prohibited from 
consumption regardless of his or her amount of contribution. On the other hand, it is 
collectively rational to contribute since the provision of a public good depends on the 
contribution by its group members. If nobody contributes, the public good will not be 
offered and all members are then worse off than if it is provided. This mixed-motive 
conflict between individual and collective rationality fits the defining property of a 
social dilemma. 
There are two types of public goods: step-level and continuous (Komorita & 
Parks, 1994). A step-level or discrete public good is one that the good will only be 
provided if a certain amount of contribution is achieved by the group. Its provision is 
all-or-none in nature. Consider the regular residential maintenance work for a 
building which requires the collection of money from the residents, the repair task is 
all-or-none nature depending on whether the amount of money collected meets the 
cost. Another type is a continuous public good, which yields proportional outcome 
depending on the amount of contribution. Thus, the good can be provided at any 
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level. Plenty examples of continuous public goods can be found in daily life, such as 
services provided by charities. The present study adopts the continuous public good. 
The Selective Play Paradigm 
The traditional research paradigm of social dilemma is a "forced play paradigm" 
(Orbell & Dawes, 1991) that players are locked in a particular relationship and do not 
have options of leaving it and joining another relationship. This paradigm cannot 
model most situations that allow us to quit the interdependent relationship or to 
choose the partners with whom we want to interact. Orbell and Dawes (1993) used 
university research as a metaphor for a social dilemma with no obligation to play. In 
real life situation, companies may select their employees and people can choose their 
friends. 
The "selective play paradigm" is a new paradigm introduced in the late 1980s 
that provides the option for leaving the relationship and choosing a new partner 
(Hayashi & Yamagishi, 1998; Orbell & Dawes, 1991; Tesfatsion, 1995). Early 
research on the selective paradigm has focused on the prisoner's dilemma game 
(PDG). A two-person PDG with the additional "choice to exit" (choice of staying or 
leaving the current relationship) is called a trinary-choice game (Orbell, 
Schwartz-Shea, & Simmons, 1984). Having a choice to exit affects people's playing 
styles and strategies. In addition, the effects differ among different kinds of players. 
Details will be presented in a later section. 
Within the selective paradigm, there are two variations. One type is the 
"non-forced play" and the other is a "fully-fledged selective play" named by 
Yamagishi and Hayashi (1996). The non-forced play is one which just adds the 
choice of exit to the traditional forced play paradigm, that is, the trinary-choice game. 
On the other hand, the fully-fledged selective play includes the choice of partners 
altogether. The latter serves as the basis for a more real-life approach toward 
understanding the conflicting choice between optimizing one's own interest versus a 
group's interest. It becomes the main focus in the recent studies of Hayashi, 
Yamagishi and their collaborators (e.g. Yamagishi, Hayashi, & Jin, 1994). 
Currently, only a few studies have adopted the selective paradigm in the context 
of public goods dilemma (Coricelli, Fehr, & Feliner, 2004; Ehrhart & Keser, 1999; 
Page，Putterman, & Unel, 2002). Because the area is better-documented in PDG than 
in PG, studies of both types of dilemmas will be summarized in the following 
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literature review section concerning the effect and selection mechanism of the 
selective paradigm. 
Effect of Selective Play on Cooperation Level 
The effect of the option to exit on cooperation level in PDG remains 
controversial. On the one hand, most researchers posited that cooperation would be 
enhanced with the choice of exit. The main reason is that more cooperators are 
willing to enter the game with the increase in cooperate-cooperate relationships 
(Orbell & Dawes, 1993). The choice of exit therefore enhances social welfare. In the 
study of Orbell and Dawes (1993), when individuals were free to accept or reject to 
play in PDG, social or aggregate welfare increased (comparing the difference of 
average payoff between binary and trinary choice rules). This increase in welfare 
occurs because intending cooperators are more willing to enter such games than are 
intending defectors, which increases the probability of socially productive 
cooperate-cooperate relationships. In particular, it is the cooperators relative to the 
defectors, who have an increase in welfare because the cooperate-cooperate payoff is 
also the best outcome for those who intend to cooperate (Orbell & Dawes, 1993). 
The willingness of the cooperators to enter the game is due to their 
introspection-based optimism about others' cooperation, which increases the 
cooperators' expected value of playing. Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee (1977) also 
found that cooperators expect much higher rates of cooperation from others than 
defectors do. 
On the other hand, Boone and Macy (1998) found no significant change in 
cooperation in repeated PDG with an exit choice in their study. Likewise, the study 
of Jin, Hayashi, and Shinotsuka (1993, cited by Yamagishi & Hayashi, 1996) also 
failed to support the hypothesis that an exit setup would promote cooperation. Boone 
and Macy (1998) speculated that it may be due to the fact that though an exit setup 
increases selectivity, it reduces partners' dependence on each other. 
Mutual dependence is crucial in promoting cooperation. At the beginning stage 
of the game, players may choose to defect each other due to individual rationality. 
However, they will gradually leam that mutual defection is not a sensible option. It is 
the nature of an ongoing relationship and perceived dependence on each other that 
leads to mutual cooperation. With the exit option, however, players' dependence on 
each other in the future is reduced. Thus, the exit option may decrease players' 
cooperation level but increase the incentive to hit and run (HAR) (especially for 
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aggressive players). Similarly, iterated supergames without exit option may help 
promote cooperation due to the effects of accountability, nonanonymity, and personal 
liability in social interactions---future sanctioning reactions of an exploited partner 
may help to divert a potential defector from defecting (Axelrod, 1984). 
Alternatively, cooperation increases with selectivity (the ability to play with a 
desired partner). Instead of retaliating against the defecting partners, cooperators can 
now choose to exit the relationship. Thus, exit allows an alternative to retaliation and 
offers cooperators the choice to refuse to play with the unsatisfactory partner by 
adopting the out-for-tat strategy (OFT). As a result, an exit option increases 
cooperation by reducing the act of retaliation. As mentioned, dependency would 
promote cooperation whereas the exit setup let defecting players play the HAR 
strategy. Therefore, the two effects cancel out each other, leading to the ambiguous 
findings in these experiments. As a result, the controversy concerning the effect of 
the exit setup on cooperation level will remain until further experiments are held for 
clarification. 
While there may be contrasting effect of dependency and selectivity on 
cooperation in the forced-play paradigm, it is proposed that with the choice of 
partner altogether, the element of dependency would thrive in the fully-fledged 
selective play paradigm. The reason is that the partners now have to depend on one 
another if they would like to continue the game and be chosen as partners. Hayashi 
and Yamagishi (1998) argued that with the choice to select partners, cooperation 
should still be the rational strategy as future interactions with the same partner is 
more likely to occur when players are satisfied with the choice of one another and 
thus choose to stay in the relationship. As a result, cooperation level will be 
increased. 
Regarding the effect of selective paradigm in public goods, all three cited 
studies proposed and also observed higher cooperation level in the conditions with 
than without the choice of partner selection (Coricelli, Fehr, & Fdiner, 2004; Ehrhart 
& Keser, 1999; Page, Putterman, & Unel, 2002). Coricelli, Fehr, and Feliner (2004) 
proposed that this is due to the principle of reciprocity. In the "no-choice of 
partnership" condition, cooperators will retaliate against the non-cooperators by 
mutual defection. With the choice of partners, however，cooperators could choose to 
group with cooperators and maintain a high level of cooperation along the games. 
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Selective Play Mechanisms 
Among the studies on selective play paradigm in PDG, there are different types 
of partner selection mechanisms. Most used a mutual choice: the PDG is played 
between two players if and only if both players mutually agree to play the game with 
each other. On the other hand, some researchers adopted the unilateral choice setup. 
Specifically, unilateral-choice requires the game to be played if at least one partner 
chooses so while the mutual choice requires both partners' consensus to continue the 
relationship (Hauk & Nagel, 2001). 
Another major variation is the design of the game such as duration and group 
size (i.e., from 2-person to N-person). In the non-forced play paradigm, multiple 
simultaneous two-person games were used in the study of Hauk and Nagel (2001). 
Another experiment used two-person repeated one-shot games (Yamagishi & 
Hayashi, 1996). There was also one study adopting a 9-person game with an exit 
choice (Orbell, Schwartz-Shea, & Simmons, 1984). In the selective play context, Jin 
et al. (1993, cited by Yamagishi & Hayashi, 1996) conducted the experiment with a 
four-person group with the choice of partners. 
Regarding the exit setup, some are simple, such as in the study of Orbell and 
Dawes (1993), there were just two conditions: binary and trinary choice rules. 
Another research carried out two experiments with two conditions each: in 
experiment 1, it included the no-exit and elective-exit options; in experiment 2, there 
were the elective-exit and forced-exit options (Boone & Macy，1999). A more 
complex setup compared three conditions: mutual choice (the PDG is played 
between two players only if both players mutually agree to play the game), unilateral 
choice (the PDG has to be played if at least one partner chooses to do so) and lock-in 
setup (no exit choice available). They found higher cooperation in the no-exit and 
unilateral-choice setup as well as more exits by competitors in the unilateral-choice 
(Hauk & Nagel, 2001). Another approach towards the exit setup was brought by the 
study of Insko, Schopler, Drigotas, Graetz, Kennedy, Cox, 8c Bomstein (1993). In 
their experiment, participants were allowed to choose among the three options of 
cooperation, withdrawal, and competition. If they choose to opt out of an interaction, 
they will receive an intermediate guaranteed outcome comparing with mutual 
cooperation (highest mutual payoff) and mutual competition (lowest mutual payoff).. 
As for whether players can choose their partners or just have the choice of 
whether they want to exit the game, as mentioned above, most research on the 
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selective play paradigm only included an exit-option while few provided the choice 
of selecting partners. But among the ones which just had an exit-option, there were 
also some variations. 
In the study of Yamagishi and Hayashi (1996), players were free to repeatedly 
interact with the same partners if they desired to, if they did not, they were free to 
leave the relationship. Similarly, iteration of a game with the same partner was 
possible, but players could exit, though just randomly assigned a new partner 
(Schuessler, 1989). In the study of Orbell and Dawes (1991, 1993), players faced a 
decision of whether playing a one-shot game, the same decision will not be repeated 
with the same partners. Though unable to choose partners, the study of Boone and 
Macy (1999) included an elective-exit choice. In this case, players could choose to 
exit a relationship and wait for a random reassignment of partner. The authors argued 
that this will increase selectivity of players as compared with the no-exit and 
forced-exit choices. Hayashi and Yamagishi (1998) are among the few researchers 
who included the choice to select partners in their PG studies (though only via 
computer simulation). The only information the players could use was their own past 
experience—for each of the past trials, with whom the player interacted and how 
many points the player earned in that interaction. 
Yamagishi and Hayashi (1996) summarized the typology of selective play. 
Generally, there are three kinds of options. One includes the exit option, but there is 
no alternative partner. Thus, the only decision is between playing and not playing. 
Examples are the simulation by Vanberg and Congleton (1992) which was a repeated 
play, the study of Orbell and Dawes (1993) and the simulation by Morikawa, Orbell, 
and Runde (1995) which were one-shot play. Another type includes an exit option 
with random assignment of a new partner. One example is the simulations conducted 
by Schuessler (1989) in which all games were all repeated-play games. In another 
study participants could decide whether to stay in the current relationship or desert 
the current partner and take a chance in interacting with a stranger (Hayashi & 
Yamagishi, 1995, cited by Yamagishi & Hayashi, 1996). The last one adds the choice 
of partners which includes the experiments carried out by Jin et al. (1993, cited by 
Yamagishi & Hayashi, 1996), Yamagishi and Komiyama (1995, cited by Yamagishi 
& Hayashi, 1996), which were repeated-play games. Experiments by Watanabe and 
Yamagishi (1995, cited by Yamagishi & Hayashi, 1996) and Kikuchi, Watanabe, and 
Yamagishi (1995, cited by Yamagishi & Hayashi, 1996) were one-shot games. The 
Public Goods Dilemma iii 
setup in previous studies which allowed players to play with the same-partner may 
imply that re-entering the game with a previously abandoned partner is possible, 
although it was not explicitly mentioned. 
For the studies in public goods, there are also variations in the experimental 
setup. Coricelli, Fehr, and Feliner (2004) used a 2-person game with a constant pool 
of 6 participants. They included both unidirectional and bidirectional partner 
selection mechanisms. On the other hand, Page, Putterman, and Unel (2002) 
employed a fixed group size of four in a population of 16 and the bidirectional 
partner selection mechanism. Finally, Ehrhart and Keser (1999) allowed the 
participants to choose among staying in the group, jumping to another group or 
starting a new group by him or herself. No restriction on group size is imposed with a 
population of nine people. Generally speaking, the studies of the partner selection 
mechanism in public goods are still at the preliminary stage. 
After all, we can see that nearly all research on the selective play paradigm were 
carried out with the two-person PDG The present study extends previous research on 
selective-play to an N-person environment, in particular, a public goods situation. 
Specifically, we aim at exploring the selective paradigm in a public goods dilemma 
and the effects of a number of potentially crucial variables on cooperation level and 
pattern of partner selection. 
Cooperation Level 
Social value orientation. How the selective play setup will influence the 
cooperation level may be affected by players' social value orientation. Kelley and 
Stahelski (1970) postulated that individuals can be classified as cooperators or 
competitors according to their goals (motives) in playing social dilemma games. 
Social value orientation (SVO) is the most studied individual differences variable in 
social dilemmas. It is a goal or motivation that influences, if not determines, 
behaviors of actors whose outcomes are interdependent. It is distinguished from a 
strategy of steering another person to choose whatever that will realize your goal. 
Conceptually defined, SVO is a "preference for a specific pattern of outcomes, in a 
setting of outcome interdependence, that is consistent over time" (McClintock, 1977; 
McClintock & Liebrand, 1988). Although a variety of social value orientations could 
be identified (e.g. Bern & Lord, 1979; Kuhlman & Wimberley, 1976; McClintock & 
Liebrand, 1988), three are most commonly studied, which are cooperators (also 
known as prosocials), competitors, and individualists (competitors and individualists 
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together known as proselfs) (Deutsch, 1960; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994; Komorita 
& Parks, 1994). These three orientations have been found to be "relatively stable 
over time (Van Lange & Semin-Goossens, 1998) and predictive of behavior in a 
variety of situations (in social dilemma experiments, e.g., Kuhlman & Marshello， 
1975; Liebrand, 1984; as well as in everyday life, e.g., helping behavior, McClintock 
& Allison, 1989)" (De Bruin & Van Lange, p. 208). A more simple classification of 
SVO is to use a 2-dimension method. Instead of an eight-type classification, people 
are categorized as prosocials (including the cooperators, altruists) or proselfs 
(including the competitors, individualists). A review of the different 
conceptualizations and empirical research on SVO appears in Au & Kwong (2004). 
The cooperation level under the selective play setup should be influenced by 
people's SVO. By definition, prosocials are those who are more concerned with 
maximizing joint outcomes and equalizing outcomes across all individuals, while the 
proselfs are primarily interested in maximizing own outcomes (Van Lange, 1999). 
Thus, the prosocials are more likely to contribute than the proselfs in a public goods 
dilemma. Before proceeding, it is worthwhile to clarify that prosocials and proselfs 
capture the underlying cooperative tendency of people. Prosocials (or proselfs) are 
people who tend to cooperate (or defect). On the other hand, cooperators and 
defectors describe the actual behavior. Cooperators (or defectors) are people who, 
over many games, have been cooperating (or defecting). We infer whether a person is 
a prosocial or proself by using measures like a Decomposed Game. As a player in the 
game, we classify other players as cooperators (or defectors) when we observe that 
these people have been cooperating (or defecting). 
HI: Prosocials will have a higher cooperation level than proselfs. Just to note 
that for standardization, cooperation level in the related hypotheses refers to the 
actual amount one contributed. 
Endowment level The effect of asymmetric endowment on people's cooperation 
level has been extensively studied (e.g. Van Dijk & Grodzka, 1992; Van Dijk & 
Wilke, 1995). This is introduced by providing people with different amount of 
resources they have in playing the game. For example, the study by Van Dijk and 
Wilke (1994) found that people with higher endowment contributed more to a PG 
game than those with lower endowment. Rapoport (1988), using a step-level 
paradigm with an all-or-none contribution rule, also obtained the result that players 
with higher endowment contributed more often. This finding could be explained by 
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two lines of reasoning. First of all, group members with higher endowment feel that 
their contribution is more important to the provision of the good and their decision 
could change the outcome of other group members. The underlying psychological 
determinant is criticality. 
Criticality is defined as one's subjective perception of how likely it is that one's 
contribution will be necessary to obtain the public good (Au, Chen, & Komorita, 
1998; De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2002). Stroebe and Frey (1982) showed that in theory 
a positive relation between criticalness and contribution should exist. The more 
critical one perceives oneself to be, the more likely he or she will contribute (Chen, 
Au, & Komorita, 1996; Kerr, 1996). Van de Kragt, Orbell, and Dawes (1983) devised 
a simple experimental technique, known as the minimal contributing set (MCS) 
paradigm, to empirically test this question. Rapoport, Bomstein, and Erev (1989) 
also found such a relation exists and is strong. A more recent study carried out by De 
Cremer and Van Dijk (2002) tried to explain the effect in terms of social 
responsibility. They argued that high perceived criticality activates feelings of social 
responsibility which in turn induces contributions. 
A related concept is self-efficacy. One's amount of endowment and resources 
can affect one's efficacy level. Self-efficacy refers to the belief that you have about 
the effect of your actions on the eventual result (Bandura, 1986). It has been 
well-documented to be an important variable in public goods behavior (Messick, 
1973; Olson, 1965), and feelings of self-efficacy have been shown to exert a strong 
influence on a person's tendency to free ride. When people have a low sense of 
self-efficacy, they are more likely to free ride than when it is high (Kerr & Bruun, 
1983). Research generally found a positive relation between efficacy and 
contributions (Kerr, 1992, 1996). 
Kerr (1992) suggested that the efficacy-contribution link may follow a norm 
which holds that it is the duty of those who are more capable of helping to do so. It 
was also found that self-efficacy is affected by group size (Kerr, 1989, 1992). People 
believe that their ability to affect the group's outcome decreases as group size 
increases. 
It is worthwhile to note that there is another side of argument holding that 
individuals with fewer resources have larger incentive to contribute because they 
gain the most from the good. By contrast, people with more resources are less 
motivated to contribute because they gain the least from it (Rapoport, 1998). 
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But generally, experimental studies found that those with more resources 
contributed more than those with smaller resources with continuous contributions in 
asymmetric PG dilemmas (Kerr, 1992; Van Dijk & Grodzka, 1992). 
H2: High endowment individuals will have higher cooperation level than low 
endowment individuals. 
Putting the effects of endowment level and SVO together, on one hand, those 
with the highest cooperation tendency should be those who have more resources and 
basically are more willing to contribute in a public good. On the other hand, those 
with little resources and a non-cooperative tendency will have the lowest cooperation 
level. Thus, the following hypothesis is formulated 
H3: Prosocials with higher endowment will have a higher cooperation level 
while proselfs’ cooperation level will not be affected by their endowment level. 
The kind of displayed information. To select their potential partners, people have 
to obtain some related information, for example, based on the information they have 
regarding others' trustworthiness (Macy & Skvoretz, 1998). The study of Frank, 
Gilovich, and Regan (1993) attempted to investigate whether individual players' 
cooperative dispositions can be discerned by others but did not make an effort to test 
its effect on people's choice of partners in the fully-fledged selective play paradigm. 
Their experiment used a face-to-face pre-game interaction between playing the PDG 
Since many variables may be involved if a face-to-face setup is adopted, the present 
experiment tried to focus people's attention on the information we displayed. 
Among the research of the selective paradigm in public goods, the kind of 
information people have about others is their past contribution history (Coricelli, 
Fehr, & Feliner, 2004; Ehrhart and Keser, 1999; Page, Putterman, & Unel, 2002). 
However, we may acquire additional information despite contribution record. In the 
social dilemma games, people may differ from one another not only in the 
cooperation rate, but also the amount of endowment which will in turn affect how 
much they can contribute. As a result, we explored whether adding the endowment 
information would affect people's decisions in this experiment. The major interest 
here is that whether the differences in the kind of information displayed will affect 
people's cooperation level and choice of partners. 
In real-life, the amount and kind of information we obtain regarding others' 
characteristics differ from one situation to another. For example, companies have 
reputation for their brands and people establish image and credibility in some online 
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auction website. The current experiment simulated the different information 
situations. It is proposed that people's cooperation level and choice of partners will 
be greatly influenced by the kind of information displayed. This study examined the 
four combinations of displaying versus not displaying cooperation and endowment 
information. 
In the "Displaying Cooperation Information Only" condition, only cooperation 
rate was displayed. Specifically, we showed people's average percentage of past 
contribution in this condition. We have chosen the average cooperation rate to be 
displayed here, rather than other statistics such as one's cooperation rate in last trial 
because we want to provide a general picture about the past action of a person. If we 
only display a person's contribution in the immediate last trial, he or she may be 
concerned with only one-trial effect and may adopt an alternative 
defective-cooperative strategy so as to take advantage of others without being 
known. 
In the "Displaying Endowment Information Only" condition only endowment 
information was displayed. The only source of information here was how much 
resource each person had. 
The "Displaying Both Cooperation Information and Endowment Information" 
condition simulates a more informed situation in real-life. We can obtain different 
kinds of information of others, such as their personality, ability, and so on. 
Finally, in the “Not Displaying Any Information" condition, people had no 
information on others' cooperation rate nor endowment level. It models a situation in 
which people barely know about each other or that channels of obtaining others' 
information are not available. 
Past studies have shown that contribution identifiability is significant in 
inducing people's cooperation level among different types of social dilemmas (e.g. in 
prisoner's dilemma, Bohnet & Frey, 1999; in public goods dilemma, Croson & 
Marks, 1998; common resource dilemma, Jorgenson & Papciak，1981). Generally, it 
was found that when one's contribution in the game can be identified by others, 
people will have higher cooperation level. The underlying reason pinpointed by 
Harkins (1987) is that people are concerned about being evaluated by others. 
Therefore, social loafing will be minimized when such evaluation effect is high, that 
is, people's work can be identified by others. It is believed that this phenomenon will 
be more pronounced when people can choose their partners. When cooperation 
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information is available to others and repeated interaction is foreseen, in order to 
initiate and sustain a group relationship, an immediate solution will be maintaining a 
certain level of cooperation. Thus, we hypothesize a main effect that displaying 
cooperation information will induce more cooperation than not displaying 
cooperation information due to higher identifiability. However, among the two 
cooperation information conditions (one with endowment information also displayed 
whereas another one without), we expect that the effect of cooperation information 
may be reduced in the Both-Information condition. It is because people will also pay 
attention to endowment information which will weaken the impact of cooperation 
information. Thus, the importance of cooperation rate is lessened in the both 
information condition than in the cooperation information condition. 
H4: In general, we hypothesize a main effect that cooperation level will be 
higher when cooperation information is displayed than not. Specifically, we stipulate 
an interaction effect that (a) when there is no information about one's cooperation 
information, endowment information will have no effect on cooperation level, and (b) 
when there is information about one's cooperation information, cooperation level is 
higher when there is no endowment information than when there is. 
Choice of Partners 
The fully-fledged selective play paradigm leads us to another question, which is 
with whom an individual will like to engage in a social dilemma. Will prosocials 
prefer forming a group with cooperators and proselfs prefer defectors? 
With the introduction of the selective play paradigm in the social dilemma 
research, some researchers such as Hayashi and Yamagishi (1998) suggested that 
action strategy (Hayashi, 1993), which means how to choose between cooperation 
and defection, becomes less important than the selection strategy, which is the choice 
of partners in the uncertain world. It is because the latter is of the utmost importance 
in determining the overall performance of the player, for what you will get is 
crucially determined by whom you choose. Though vitally important, this area is not 
well-documented, especially in the context of public goods. The experiment of Frank, 
Gilovich, and Regan (1993) addressed whether individual players' cooperative 
dispositions can be discerned by others by a 30-minute pre-game interaction. They 
discovered that people have quite accurate prediction about others' choice in a 
one-shot PG game (the decision was only either cooperation or defection). However, 
they did not take a step forward to investigate the implication of identifying 
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cooperators and defectors on people's choice of partners, which is a key feature in 
the fully-fledged selective play paradigm. Yamagishi and Hayashi (1996) also 
contended that there are practically no systematic studies on selection strategies in 
the selective play paradigm. Our study, therefore, attempted to examine some of the 
criteria for selecting partners in a continuous public goods dilemma. 
Social value orientation. Again, the SVO of players may play an important role 
in their choice of partners. People readily form impressions on one another and use 
this as guidance for their own action. According to the might-vs-morality hypothesis, 
people of different social value orientation have different tendencies in forming 
impressions of others (Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). Prosocials assign greater 
weight to honesty information than do proselfs, whereas the proselfs assign greater 
weight to intelligence information than do the prosocials. Further support came from 
De Bruin and Van Lange's study (2000) showing that more proselfs than prosocials 
searched for additional competence information after morality information. 
In addition, proselfs' impression of others was affected more strongly by 
competence information and less strongly by morality information than prosocials'. 
Impressions about others are especially important because they may help predict the 
other person's behavior and guide one's own behavior. Thus, we can see that people 
are concerned about different information generated from others' behavior based on 
their own SVO. Therefore, it is possible that their perception of the game and the 
others will be used as the criteria to choose partners in the selective play paradigm. 
Interestingly, it is speculated that both proselfs and prosocials like to choose 
cooperators as partners, but for different reasons. 
Basically, cooperators and noncooperators differ in their perception of 
mixed-motive interactions (Liebrand, Jansen, Rijken, & Suhre, 1986; McClintock & 
Liebrand, 1988). On one hand, prosocials look to morality information (Van Lange & 
Kuhlman, 1994) and consider those who cooperate as good and intelligent (Van 
Lange, Liebrand, & Kuhlman, 1990; Van Lange & Liebrand, 1991). In short, they 
will choose to play with those they consider good and won't be exploited by, the 
cooperators. On the other hand, proselfs will also like to group with the cooperators 
in order to exploit their interests. As a result, we propose that people in general prefer 
choosing cooperators, rather than defectors, as partners. But this is conditional upon 
the kind of information displayed (i.e. cooperation information), and the hypothesis 
will be stated later. 
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Endowment level. There are no empirical studies of the effect of endowment 
level on a player's popularity for being chosen as partners in the social dilemma 
game. In our study, it is proposed that people prefer people of high endowment as 
these people have a higher potential to contribute more. This expectation is also 
related to the higher probability that higher endowment individuals will contribute 
due to the criticality and efficacy effects as described above. For prosocials, they 
choose people with high endowment as they expect these people will cooperate as 
well. For proselfs, they choose people with high endowment since they may free ride 
on them to get benefits. Therefore, people of higher endowment will be more popular 
as partners. Again, this is conditional upon displaying the endowment information, 
and the hypothesis will be stated later. 
Combining the two effects of cooperation rate and endowment level, we also 
suggest that cooperators with higher endowment will be most likely to be chosen as 
partners. This would be found only when both kinds of information are displayed and 
the hypothesis will be stated later. 
When players can discern cooperators from non-cooperators, Frank, Gilovich, 
and Regan (1993) suggested that only cooperators would be chosen for interaction. 
We anticipated the preference for cooperators would be generalized across both high 
endowment and low endowment individuals, but for different reasons. High 
endowment individuals, who may easily be exploited because of their high 
endowment level, will avoid defectors because of fear of exploitation. Low 
endowment individuals, however, have the added incentive of free-riding on 
cooperators' contributions, and might even adopt a hit and run strategy (Boone & 
Macy, 1999). This will lead to a similar suggestion as stated above, that people are 
more likely to choose cooperators as their partners regardless of their differing 
intentions. 
The kind of displayed information. One of the major research questions in this 
study concerns whether: cooperation rate or endowment level information is more 
critical in the partner selection process. Endowment information represents the 
implied ability of the player and how much he or she could contribute to the group, 
whereas cooperation information is a behavior-based information or record of one's 
cooperative history. Both pieces of information of others may be important since they 
are directly related to how many marks a group can potentially aggregate (in 
accordance with the time they can or have contributed). 
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Choice of partners will also be affected by the kind of information displayed. As 
explained above, it is suggested that cooperators will be more likely to be chosen if 
cooperation rate is provided (H5); whereas if endowment information is provided, 
then high endowment players will more likely be chosen (H6). In the condition that 
no information is provided, people may choose partners randomly. Finally, when 
both kinds of information are displayed, the hypothesis is formulated in H7: 
Cooperators with higher endowment will be most likely to be chosen as partners. 
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Chapter 2. Method 
Participants 
A total of three hundred and three students at the Chinese University of Hong 
Kong participated in the study. They joined a one hour and fifteen minutes individual 
decision-making computerized experiment voluntarily for a base payment of HK$50. 
Recruitment of participants was conducted through an advertisement in the mass 
mailing system of the university. 
Design 
The present study used a university course scenario to examine the effect of two 
experimental variables: Endowment level (low, medium, and high) and the kind of 
displayed information, and two measurement variables: social value orientation 
(proselfs and prosocials) and cooperation rate (defectors and cooperators) on two 
dependent variables of cooperation level and choice of partners in a selective play 
paradigm of a public goods dilemma. In the experiment, participants' endowment 
level and cooperation rate varied trial by trial. On the other hand, SVO, the display of 
cooperation information, and the display of endowment information are 
between-subjects variables here. On the analyses conducted for cooperation level, 
endowment level is a within-subjects factor whereas cooperation rate is not included 
because practically speaking it is the same measure as this DV. In the trial by trial 
analysis of choice of partners, cooperation rate and endowment level are both 
between-subjects factors at the one-trial level. Generally, we have used a 2 x 2 x 2 x 
2 x 3 split-plot design. 
The variable of SVO was measured by the nine choice situations in the 
Decomposed Game (Van Lange, Otten, Bruin, & Joireman, 1997). In half of the 16 
sessions, the questionnaire was administered to the participants at the beginning of 
the experiment whereas in another half of the sessions at the end. This is to balance 
the sequence effect so as to minimize the chance that filling in the questionnaire will 
affect the decisions of the participants in the computer experiment. This 
questionnaire examines their tendency of cooperation-competition and it was used to 
classify participants as prosocials (cooperative or altruistic) versus proselfs 
(individualistic or competitive). In particular, participants had to choose among the 
three options in the nine situations. 
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Appendix A shows the decomposed game questionnaire in detail. Referring to 
the example used in the questionnaire, option A is to allocate 500 points for self and 
100 points for the other; option B is to allocate 500 points for both self and the other; 
option C is to allocate 550 points for self and 300 points for the other. Option A 
represents the competitive choice, as it provides a larger difference between self and 
the other's outcomes (500-100=400). Option B represents the prosocial choice, as it 
provides a larger joint outcome (500+500=1000). Meanwhile, it also gives a smaller 
discrepancy between one's self and the other's outcome (500-500=0) than either 
option A or option C. Finally, option C refers to the individualistic choice, while 
one's self outcome (550) is larger than is those in option A (500) or B (500). As a 
result, participants were classified as prosocial, individualistic, or competitive if at 
least six out of the nine choices were consistent with one of these social value 
orientations. For the classification in our study, the competitive and individualistic 
orientations were grouped as the proself orientation. Following the above criteria, we 
identified 137 prosocials (45.2%) and 120 proselfs (39.6%) while 46 participants 
(15.2%) could not be classified. 
On the other hand, participants were classified as cooperators and defectors 
according to their cooperation rate on a particular trial. A z-score was calculated 
based on their cooperation rate compared with the others in the same session on the 
same trial. Then, a participant having a negative statistic was classified as a defector 
whereas one having a positive statistic was classified as a cooperator on that trial. 
Basic scenario 
The scenario described the participants as having taken a course which required 
them to engage in some individual tests and group projects in the semester. Both the 
test and project were to be conducted weekly. The participants were informed that 
there were a finite number of weeks (there were ten trials in the experiment). They 
were randomly assigned to one of the three endowment groups in each week: having 
6, 9, or 12 hours to work on the course. Participants had to allocate time between 
studying for the test (defection) and working on the project (cooperation) for each 
week. If one has 6 hours and decides to allocate 5 hours to the individual test, then 
only 1 hour will be available for the group project. Marks they received in the test 
and the project corresponded to the time spent on these two tasks. The payoff 
structure will be explained in detail in the procedure section. The background 
scenario distributed to the participants is enclosed in Appendix B. 
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The assignment of time available for the three groups of participants (6 hours, 9 
hours, and 12 hours) is a manipulation of their endowment level, which was 
randomly assigned by the computer program in each trial. The different endowment 
level of each participant is also an accurate reflection of the university students' 
situation. Since there are a variety of courses taken and activities joined by different 
students, they may give different priority to different tasks and duties. 
The proportion of time allocated to the project in proportion to the participants' 
total available time in each week (i.e., 6, 9 or 12 hours) was computed. This, together 
with the actual number of hours they assigned to the group project, served as two 
measurements of participants' cooperation level. 
Procedures 
There were 13-24 participants in each session. In total, there were 16 sessions 
conducted, with the four information display conditions each taking up four sessions 
to be more balanced. The experiments were conducted at a computer laboratory. 
Upon arriving at the laboratory, participants were alternatively seated. The computer 
terminals were arranged in a 6 x 9 matrix facing the same direction. Seating 
alternatively could prevent them from watching others' identity or discussing 
decisions during the experiment. 
The experiment was introduced to the participants as a decision-making task. 
They were first asked to sign an informed consent form and in half sessions fill in a 
resource allocation decomposed game questionnaire. Appendix C presents the 
consent form. Procedures of the experiment and the scenario were read aloud once to 
the participants with the visual aid of a multimedia presentation. They could also 
refer to the written instruction and payoff charts on the table. The sheets will be 
illustrated later. Participants were welcomed to ask any questions. The whole 
experiment was conducted via the computer. 
Participants were told that they had taken a course with group projects (50%) 
and individual tests (50%) as the course requirement. Each participant would 
role-play a student in this course and had to select project group members for the 
project work and make decisions on the distribution of available time between the 
group project and the individual tests. The number of weeks was kept undisclosed so 
as to prevent any end-game effect such that they may all try to defect in the last trial 
as they foresaw the end of the experiment. 
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As mentioned, participants were assigned randomly such that in each week (on 
each trial) about one-third of them will have 6, 9, and 12 hours of time available for 
the coursework. Their identity was kept anonymous as they were only be represented 
by a unique alphabetic identity randomly assigned to them on each trial (A, B, 
C …Z). Their identity changed trial by trial so as to prevent participants from 
choosing their previous project members habitually. 
In order to encourage participants to make their decisions seriously, they were 
promised an extra bonus contingent upon "the sum of their scores in two of the 
weeks". Two participants were randomly drawn in each experimental session and 
were paid HK$1 for each point of their scores as calculated by the computer program. 
The bonus ranged from HK$40 to HK$102 with an average amount of HK$74.3. 
Group Members Selection Stage 
There were three stages on each trial: (a) a group member selection stage, (b) an 
hour allocation stage，and (c) a feedback stage. In the group member selection phase 
participants had two minutes to select their group members. Figure 1 presents the 
screenshot of Group Members Selection Stage. 
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Figure 1 
Screenshot of Group Members Selection Stage 
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Each participant was represented by a circle on the computer screen. One's own 
circle was blue in color and was placed in the center, which was surrounded by 
circles of other people that were in red. Information displayed differed in the four 
experimental conditions: (a) No information at all, (b) Only the past cooperation rate, 
(c) Only the endowment information, and (d) Both the cooperation rate and 
endowment information. These pieces of information, if applicable, were shown 
inside the circles. If they wished to form groups with a particular classmate, they 
could either click on others' circles in the middle of the screen or the buttons 
representing the corresponding players on the right column. The computer program 
would automatically record the information about the links, e.g. a link initiated by 
"A" to invite "B" to form a group. A participant may select (i.e., click) the same 
target multiple times because of not realizing the computer program has already 
registered his or her request or because of impatience. In any event, the repeated 
links that involved the same pair of participants were counted once only. 
A group would only be formed when both players chose each other or people in 
the same group all chose the person who wanted to enter the group. Once a group 
was formed, the group members would then be grouped into a common (larger) 
circle. Participants could choose to exit the group. The number of members in a 
group was limited to five so as to encourage people to be selective in choosing their 
members or they might just include as many members as possible without any 
consideration. If a person could not form a group within two minutes, that person 
would have to remain alone without any group members. 
Hour Allocation Stage 
After the Group Members Selection Stage ended, participants entered the Hour 
Allocation stage that they had to make decisions on time distribution between 
working on the group project (cooperation) and studying for the individual test 
(defection). They were instructed to allocate their time in order to maximize their 
final scores in the course. Participants were reminded that spending too much time 
either on the project or the test would make them have less time on the other part. 
What they also had to consider was that their project marks would be co-determined 
by themselves and their group members. It means that larger amount of total time 
contributed by the group would yield higher marks for their project. The same 
principle applied to the marks they would receive for the individual test. 
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More precisely, the group project score had a diminishing marginal return 
relation with the number of hours contributed to the group project by all group 
members. This payoff structure was presented graphically to the participants on the 
instructions and the screenshot is presented in Figure 2. 
Similarly, the individual test score had a diminishing marginal return in 
proportion to the number of hours devoted to studying for the test. This payoff 
structure was presented graphically to the participants on the instructions and the 
screenshot is presented in Figure 3. 
Public Goods Dilemma iii 
Figure 2 
Screenshot of Payoff Structure for Group Project 
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Figure 3 
Screenshot of Payoff Structure for Individual Test 
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marks for the test. 
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Because all members in the same group would receive the same score in the 
group project regardless of individual member's time contribution to it, there was a 
temptation to free-ride by allocating more time on studying for individual test. 
In the hour allocation decision-making stage of the experiment, participants had 
to estimate the number of hours that their group members would contribute to the 
group project, in addition to making a decision on time allocation between studying 
for the test and the group project. According to their estimation of group members' 
contribution to the group project and their own allocation to the group project, their 
group project scores, individual test scores, total scores, and total monetary payoffs 
would be updated on the computer screen both graphically and numerically. 
Participants could try out different combinations of “estimation of group member 
allocation" and "own allocation" to see how these values affect their scores. This 
interactive tryout procedure helps ensure that the participants understand how 
changes in hour allocation will affect the scores they obtain for the test, project, and 
total score. Figure 4 shows the screenshot of decision-making stage of hour 
allocation. There was no time-limit for the participants to make the allocation 
decisions. Typically, it took about 2 minutes for all participants to finish making their 
decisions. 
Feedback Stage 
After all members confirmed their choices, the computer program entered the 
feedback stage that participants would receive a score combining their marks of the 
project and the test. Participants would be able to see how each of the group 
members has allocated their hours to the group project and the individual test and 
their respective scores. The screenshot is shown in figure 5. This is the end of one 
experimental week (trial). There were 10 trials in total for the experiment. 
When the experiment ended, in half the sessions participants were asked to fill 
in the decomposed game questionnaire. The instruction and questionnaire adopted in 
the present experiment were generated or backward translated from English into 
Chinese. 
At the end, the lucky draws were conducted and the base payment of HK$50 
was distributed to each participant. They had to sign a payment receipt and were 
debriefed. The debriefing form is attached in Appendix D. 
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Figure 4 
Screenshot of Hour Allocation Decision-making Stage 
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Notes: 
A: Information about group members: the identity of the members in one's group and 
their endowment level in that particular week. 
B: One's estimation of the total amount of time their group members will contribute 
in that week (excluding themselves). Participants could click a different number to 
look at the corresponding marks he/she can obtain based on a particular estimation 
on their group members' contribution. This number simply helps a participant guess 
his/her total marks (and bonus) from the estimation and his/her decision. This value 
does not indicate nor affect the actual number of hours that the group members 
would allocate to the group project. 
C: No. of hours one wants to put on the project. Participants could click a different 
number to look at the corresponding marks he/she can obtain. 
D: Total amount of hours by estimation of group members and one's own decision 
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E: Tentative marks obtained from the project based on the sum of total contribution 
calculated from the estimation about group members and one's decision on hour 
allocation. 
F: No. of hours one wants to put on the test 
G: Tentative marks obtained from the test 
H: Total marks (sum of test and project marks) 
I: Amount of bonus earned (if he/she wins in the lucky draw) 
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Figure 5 
Screenshot of Feedback Stage Results of 
week (trial) 2 
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E: Marks he/she obtained in the test 
F: Marks he/she obtained in the group project 
G: Total marks he/she obtained in the week 
H: Amount of bonus earned (if he/she wins in the lucky draw) 
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Chapter 3. Results 
Results on Cooperation Level 
The hypotheses related to participants' cooperation level on the 10 trials in the 
experiments of the present study were tested using repeated measures analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). It was only in session R there was a computer problem that the 
experiment ended at trial 7, while all the other sessions had data for all 10 trials. 
In this experiment, participants' cooperation level can be assessed in two ways: i) 
the amount of time one put to the group project (AmountTime), and ii) the proportion 
of time one allocated to the group project relative to their time limit (endowment 
level) in that week (ProportionTime). We have analyzed these two dependent 
measures separately and the detailed ANOVA results showing the effects of each 
factor on AmountTime and ProportionTime are presented in Table 1 and 2 
respectively. 
Four independent variables including one within-subjects factor: Endowment 
level (Endow) and three between-subj ects factors: Display of cooperation 
information (Cooplnfo), Display of endowment information (Endowlnfo), and Social 
value orientation (SVO) were proposed to affect cooperation level. For the 
within-subjects factor, Endowment level, each participant went through the three 
levels of treatment (low, medium, and high) in the experimental session. That is, they 
received a random computer-generated endowment treatment trial by trial (either 
having 6, 9 or 12 hours for the course work on each trial). While the number of 
participants assigned to each of the three endowment levels were balanced and were 
the same across trials, some participants by chance were assigned to some of the 
endowment levels more than others. 
Effect of social value orientation. We hypothesized in HI that prosocials would 
contribute more than proselfs and this is supported by our results, F (1, 235) = 4.82 
for AmountTime and F (1, 241) 二 4.95 for ProportionTime, p's < .05. Generally, 
prosocials contributed significantly more time both for AmountTime and 
ProportionTime than the proselfs (Mprosociai = .245 and Mproseif = -208 for 
ProportionTime and Mprosociai 二 2.162 and Mproseif = 1.839 for AmountTime). 
Effect of endowment level Because the statistics obtained from Mauchly's test 
of sphericity showed that the variance-covariance matrix assumption was violated for 
the measures of ProportionTime, p < .01, it called for an adjustment to the numerator 
and denominator degrees of freedom in order to validate the univariate F statistic. We 
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have chosen the more conservative statistic Greenhouse-Geisser to examine the 
within-subjects effects. The results showed that the effect of endowment on 
cooperation level differed between the AmountTime and ProportionTime measures. 
AmountTime. Our second hypothesis proposed that high endowment individuals 
would contribute more than low endowment individuals. This hypothesis is 
supported such that there is a significant Endow effect, F (2, 470) 二 51.41, p < .05. 
Participants with higher endowment did contribute more hours than those with lower 
endowment (M6-hour = 1.454, IVb-hour = 2.118, and Mi 2-hour = 2.428). 
ProportionTime. On the contrary, there was an opposite Endow effect for the 
ProportionTime measure, F (1.8, 422.946) = 7.12，p < .05. Participants with higher 
endowment contributed proportionally less to the project than those with lower 
endowment (Me-hour = .242, Mg-hom = .235, and Mn-hour = .202). We will address the 
meaning of the differences between the actual and proportion amount of hours in the 
discussion section. 
Since the Endow x SVO interaction is not statistically significant, the third 
hypothesis expecting prosocials with higher endowment will have a higher 
cooperation level while proselfs' cooperation level will not be affected by their 
endowment level is rejected. 
Effect of displaying cooperation information. We hypothesized in H4 that 
cooperation level would be higher when cooperation information wais displayed than 
not. The result we obtained supports this hypothesis, F (1, 235) 二 153.68 for 
AmountTime and F (1, 241) 二 159.56 for ProportionTime, p's < .05. Participants 
contributed more hours (AmountTime) and proportionally more hours 
(ProportionTime) to the group project when cooperation information was displayed 
than not (McoopinfoOispiayed = 2.913 and McoopinfoNotoispiayed =1.088 for AmountTime and 
McoopinfoDispiayed 二 .332 and McoopinfoNotDispiayed = .121 for ProportionTime). Our H4 
also stipulated that Cooplnfo and Endowlnfo would interact to affect the cooperation 
level but we did not find any statistically significant interaction effects and thus this 
hypothesis is only partially supported. 
Effect of displaying endowment information. On the other hand, there is an 
unexpected significant effect of Endowlnfo, F (1, 235) = 11.65 for AmountTime and 
F (1, 241) = 11.19 for ProportionTime, p's < .05. Specifically, when endowment 
information was not displayed, participants contributed more hours (AmountTime) 
and proportionally more hours (ProportionTime) than when endowment information 
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was displayed ( M E n d o w I n f o D i s p l a y e d = 1.749 and M E n d o w I n f o N o t O i s p l a y e d = 2.251 for 
AmountTime and MEndowInfoDisplayed = .199 and M E n d o w I n f o N o t O i s p l a y e d = .255 for 
ProportionTime). 
Effect of endowment level and display of cooperation information. Displaying 
cooperation information moderated the endowment effect on cooperation level. 
Similarly, we found that the pattern of interactions differed between the measures of 
AmountTime and ProportionTime. 
AmountTime. The Endow x Cooplnfo interaction was statistically significant, F 
(2, 470) = 5.94, p < .05. From the results of a simple main effect analysis, we 
observed that participants with higher endowment contributed more both when 
cooperation information was displayed and not, F (1.805, 250.873) = 57.73 when 
cooperation was displayed and F (2, 282) = 23.61 when it was not, p's < .05. Noting 
the F value when cooperation information was displayed is larger, we may say that 
higher endowment individuals contributed more, especially when cooperation 
information was displayed (Ms-hour = 2.162, Mg.hour = 2.945, and Mi 2-hour = 3.58). 
Figure 6 presents the interaction pattern. 
Figure 6 
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ProportionTime. The interaction of Endow x Cooplnfo was significant on this 
measure also, F (1.8, 422.946) = 7.64, p < .05. Because this two-way interaction is 
subsumed under a higher order significant interaction, we would present the pattern 
of result in the following. 
Effect of endowment level, display of endowment, and cooperation information. 
ProportionTime. The significant three-way interaction of Endow x Cooplnfo x 
Endowlnfo that is only found in the measure of ProportionTime, F (1.8, 422.946)= 
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3.38, p < . 0 5 . 
From the results of a simple interaction analysis, there is a significant Cooplnfo 
X Endowlnfo interaction only in the low endowment group, F (1, 290) = 4.45, p < .05. 
In the 6 hour endowment group, a simple main effect was obtained such that the 
display of endowment information had a significant impact on cooperation level only 
when cooperation information was also displayed, F (1, 143) = 6.03, p<.05. When 
cooperation was not displayed, the display of endowment information had no effect 
on cooperation level. Specifically, endowment information would decrease 
cooperation level only when cooperation information was present and in the low 
endowment group (Me-hour = .32, Mg.hour = .293, and Mi 2-hour = .279). This fits our 
prediction in H4 saying that endowment information would influence cooperation 
level only under the presence of cooperation information. Unfortunately, this 
Cooplnfo X Endowlnfo interaction was obtained only in the low endowment group. 
Figures 7 and 8 present the interaction pattern. 
Figure 7 
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Figure 8 
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Table 1 Statistics ofAN OVA Analysis on AmountTime 
Source df F p 
Between subjects 
Cooperation Information 1 153 68* 00 
(Cooplnfo) . . 
Endowment Information . 1165* 00 
(Endowlnfo) ‘ ‘ 
Social Value Orientation (SVO) 1 4.82* .03 
Cooplnfo X Endowlnfo 1 0.83 .36 
Cooplnfo X SVO 1 0.00 .98 
Endowlnfo x SVO 1 0.05 .83 
Cooplnfo X Endowlnfo x SVO 1 0.00 .96 
^ ^ (3.76) 
Within subjects 
Endowment (Endow) 2 51.41* .00 
Endow X Cooplnfo 2 5.94* .00 
Endow X Endowlnfo 2 2.18 .11 
Endow X SVO 2 0.22 .81 
Endow X Cooplnfo x Endowlnfo 2 1.59 .21 
Endow X Cooplnfo x SVO 2 0.17 .84 
Endow X Endowlnfo x SVO 2 0.13 .88 
Endow X Cooplnfo x Endowlnfo ^ 0 44 65 
X SVO ‘ • 
group error 470 (1.11) 
*p < .05 (two-tailed). 
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Table 2 Statistics of AN OVA Analysis on ProportionTime 
Source df F p 
Between subjects 
Cooperation Information . . -g ^^^ ^^ 
(Cooplnfo) i D义） 
Endowment Information 1 1119* 00 
(Endowlnfo) . . 
Social Value Orientation (SVO) 1 4.95* .03 
Cooplnfo X Endowlnfo 1 1.59 .21 
Cooplnfo X SVO 1 0.00 1 
Endowlnfo x SVO 1 0.02 .89 
Cooplnfo X Endowlnfo x SVO 1 0.00 .98 
^ ^ (0.05) 
Within subjects 
Endowment (Endow) 1.8 7.12* .00 
Endow X Cooplnfo 1.8 7.64* .00 
Endow X Endowlnfo 1.8 1.17 .31 
Endow X SVO 1.8 0.18 .81 
Endow X Cooplnfo x Endowlnfo 1.8 3.38* .04 
Endow X Cooplnfo x SVO 1.8 0.2 .8 
Endow X Endowlnfo x SVO 1.8 0.13 .85 
Endow X Cooplnfo x Endowlnfo . g • 61 
X SVO ‘ ‘ ‘ 
group error 422.95 (0.02) 
*p < .05 (two-tailed). 
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Results on Choice of Partners 
Again, ANOVA was conducted to determine the significant factors of 
participants' choice of partners. We have chosen to analyze the data for trials 1, 2, 5， 
and 10 for the choice of partner. The reason is that the results in these trials should 
provide us with a representative picture about the participants' choice of partners in 
consideration of the potential sequence effects from trial 1 to trial 10. Trial 1 data 
serves as the baseline because the participants started to play the game. This trial 
does not contain the data of CoopRate nor effect of Cooplnfo since no cooperation 
information can be calculated or displayed. For trial 2, there is a fresh cooperation 
rate effect of the immediately past trial not contaminated by other trials. For trial 5, it 
serves as the middle stage of the experiment and could tell us if there are any 
changes in participants' choice of partners after some game experience. Finally, trial 
lO's data could let us know if there are any end-game effects. 
There are three measures for us to examine people's choice of partners. The first 
dependent measure is the average number of links that a participant received in a 
particular trial (labeled as MeanLink). In the experiment, participants were given two 
minutes of time to form groups. In order for the two persons, e.g. A and B，to form a 
group, "A" has to initiate a “link” to select "B" and “B，，also has to initiate a "link" to 
select "A". The number of links one received reflects how popular he/she was as a 
group member. A higher number of links indicates that this person is a more popular 
partner. The statistic was adjusted by calculating the mean number of links in a 
particular session so as to take into account the potential effect of the different 
number of participants in different sessions. For example, comparing the two 
sessions with 15 and 24 participants respectively, it is more likely for the participants 
in the session with more people to receive more links. The adjusted statistic is the 
within session z-score. This MeanLink statistic should reflect how popular a 
participant was as a partner while controlling for the number of participants in each 
session. 
The second measure is the average number of hours among the partners that a 
participant has chosen (labeled as OtherEndow). For example, if A has chosen B, C 
and D who have six, nine, and nine hours respectively, then the OtherEndow statistic 
would be obtained by averaging 6, 9, and 9, this equals 8. A larger number reflects 
that this participant tended to choose partners with higher endowment level. Again, 
to adjust for the effect of the average number of hours owned by participants in 
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different sessions, we calculated the within-session centered-score for this statistic. 
We have centered the score because this statistic was affected by the mean 
endowment level owned by the participants in a particular session. Comparing two 
sessions with average endowments of 8 and 10 hours, it is more likely for 
participants in the higher average endowment session to have a higher OtherEndow 
statistic as a result. After the adjustment was made, a positive statistic means that the 
participant tended to choose partners with higher endowment compared with others 
in the same session; a zero means that he/she tended to choose partners with an 
average endowment and a negative statistic means that this participant tended to 
choose others with a lower endowment level. 
The third measure is the average cooperation rate among the partners that a 
participant has chosen (labeled as OtherCoop). For example, if A has chosen B, C 
and D who have cooperation rates of .23, .33, and .31 respectively, then the 
OtherCoop statistic would be obtained by averaging .23, .33, and .31 which is .29. A 
higher OtherCoop shows that this participant tended to choose partners with a higher 
cooperation rate. The adjustment applied to OtherEndow was also applied to the 
OtherCoop statistic. Again, we have centered the score because the statistic may be 
affected by the mean cooperation rate of the participants in a particular session. 
Comparing two sessions with average cooperation rates of .23 and .55, it is more 
likely for the participants in the higher average cooperation level session to have a 
higher OtherCoop statistic as a result. After the adjustment was made, a positive 
statistic means that the participant tended to choose partners with higher cooperation 
rate (cooperators) compared with others in the same session; a zero means that he/she 
tended to choose partners with average cooperation rate and a negative statistic 
means that this participant tended to choose others with lower cooperation rate 
(defectors). 
The IVs included five between-subjects factors: (a) categorization from the 
results of cooperation rate as an indicator of cooperator/defector (labeled as 
CoopRate), (b) The number of hours one had in a particular week (i.e., 6, 9 or 12 
hours) (labeled as Endow), as a manipulation of endowment level (c) Display of 
cooperation information (labeled as Cooplnfo), (d) Display of endowment 
information (labeled as Endowlnfo), and (e) categorization from the results of Social 
Value Orientation as an indicator of proself/ prosocial orientation (labeled as SVO). 
All the above factors are between-subjects factors at the one-trial level. 
Public Goods Dilemma iii 
Since SVO and cooperation rate differ such that SVO refers to one's tendency to 
cooperate whereas cooperation rate is the record of actual behavior, we include only 
one of them in the analyses where appropriate. Specifically, since the first dependent 
measure taps the average number of links a participant received, the SVO 
information which was unknown to others was omitted in the analysis. On the other 
hand, as the dependent measures of OtherEndow and OtherCoop are about one's 
active behavior in choosing others' endowment level and cooperation rate, one's 
SVO should operate while cooperation rate was not included. 
For the average number of links that a participant received (MeanLink), the four 
variables of Endow, CoopRate, Cooplnfo, and Endowlnfo and all their respective 
interactions were entered into the equation. In the following, we will only present the 
pattern of results of the higher order interaction(s) which has a significant effect on 
more than two trials because they are the more robust effects. That means, when a 
particular 3-way interaction was obtained consistently, we will only present the 
pattern of results on it and will not go into detail of the 2-way interaction and main 
effects which are subsumed under it. Detailed ANOVA results showing the effects of 
each factor on these four trials are summarized in Table 3. We will summarize the 
robust significant effects with the aid of graphical presentations in the following. 
Characteristics of Popular Partners 
Effect of cooperation rate, display of endowment and cooperation information. 
The significant CoopRate x Cooplnfo x Endowlnfo interaction is obtained on trials 2 
and 5, F (1, 255) 二 7.95 for trial 2, and F (2, 279) 二 4.98 for trial 5, p，s < .05. Simple 
interaction analysis by the two endowment information conditions revealed that the 
CoopRate x Cooplnfo interaction is significant only when endowment information 
was not displayed, F (1, 139) = 20.37 for trial 2, and F (1, 148) 二 24.71 for trial 5, p's 
< .05, whereas this interaction was not significant when endowment information was 
displayed. 
Further simple main effect analysis (under the not displaying endowment 
information condition) showed that cooperators were chosen more often than 
defectors only when cooperation information was present, F (1, 69) = 36.31 for trial 
2, and F (1, 73) = 36.46 for trial 5, p's < .05, and this main effect was not found when 
cooperation information was absent. The effect was found to be consistent across the 
two trials. For example, IVbefector = -.55, and M c o o p e r a t o r = .598 when both kinds of 
information were present on trial 2. When endowment information was displayed, 
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participants' preference for the cooperators was much less obvious. The conclusion 
based on this interaction result is that when only cooperation information is provided, 
cooperators are more popular as partners. This finding supports H5: When 
cooperation information is displayed, people in general prefer choosing cooperators, 
rather than defectors, as partners. But this is conditional upon the absence of 
endowment information. Figure 9 and 10 present the interaction pattern on trial 2. 
Figure 9 
Effect of cooperation rate, displaying cooperation and 
endowment information on trial 2 
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Effect of endowment level and display of endowment information. There is a 
significant interaction of Endow x Endowlnfo on trials 1, 2, 5, and 10, F (2, 297)= 
12.96 for trial 1, F (2, 255) = 20.32 for trial 2, F (2, 279) = 21.77 for trial 5, and F (2, 
261) 二 10.58 for trial 10, p's < .05. Simple main effect analysis showed that 
participants with higher endowment were more likely to be chosen as partners only 
when endowment information was displayed, F (2, 148) = 41.75 for trial 1, F (2, 148) 
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=67.67 for trial 2, F (2, 148) 二 50.11 for trial 5, F (2, 148) = 20.47 for trial 10, p's 
< .05. The effect was found to be consistent across the four trials. For example, 
M6hour 二 -.878, M9hour = -.049, and Mi2hour = .795 when endowment information was 
displayed on trial 2. This finding supports H6: When endowment information is 
displayed, people prefer choosing high endowment individuals than low endowment 
individuals as partners. Figure 11 presents the interaction pattern on trial 2. 
Figure 11 
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Because the four-way interaction of CoopRate x Endow x Cooplnfo x 
Endowlnfo is not statistically significant in neither trial, H7 which proposed that 
when both kinds of information are displayed, cooperators with higher endowment 
will be most likely to be chosen as partners cannot be ascertained. 
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Table 3 Summary of Statistics ofANOVA Analysis on MeanLink on Trials 1’ 2，5, and 10 
- Source Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 5 Trial 10 
Cooperation Rate df - 1 1 1 
(CoopRate) F - 15.67* 10.77* 6.47* 
Endowment (Endow) 言 21.09* 16* 24.L* 6.26* 
Cooperation Information df - 1 1 1 
(Cooplnfo) F - 0.14 0.00 0.1 
Endowment Information df 1 1 1 1 
(Endowlnfo) F 0.15 0.01 0.5 0.05 
df 2 2 2 
CoopRate x Endow p . o.83 1.64 0.25 
^ df 1 1 1 
CoopRate x Cooplnfo F _ 15 21* 30 08* 8 14* 
^ df 1 1 1 
CoopRate x Endowlnfo p _ q 0 68 0 17 
^ df 2 2 2 
Endow X Cooplnfo p _ 0.44 1.89 0.64 
^ df 2 2 2 2 
Endow X Endowlnfo p i2.96* 20.32* 21.77* 10.58* 
Cooplnfo X Endowlnfo p^  . 0.O8 0.00 0.21 
CoopRate x Endow x df 2 2 2 
Cooplnfo F - 1.47 2.4 1.86 
CoopRate x Endow x df - 2 2 2 
Endowlnfo F - 0.06 0.11 0.76 
CoopRate x Cooplnfo x df 1 1 1 
Endowlnfo F - 7.95* 4.98* 0.94 
Endow X Cooplnfo x df 2 2 2 
Endowlnfo F - 0.72 1.4 0.65 
CoopRate x Endow x df 2 2 2 
Cooplnfo X Endowlnfo F - 0.07 0.42 0.63 
df 297 255 279 261 
^ F (0.77) (0.69) (0.68) (0.82) 
*p < .05 (two-tailed). 
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Who Like Choosing Others with a Higher Endowment Level? 
While examining another dependent variable OtherEndow, the four predictors 
of the Endow, Cooplnfo, Endowlnfo, and SVO and their interactions were entered 
into the equation. In the following, we will only present the pattern of results of the 
higher order interaction(s) which has a significant effect on more than two trials 
because they are the more robust effects. That means, when a particular 3-way 
interaction is obtained, we will only present the pattern of results on it and will not 
go into detail of the 2-way interaction and main effects which are subsumed under it. 
Detailed ANOVA results showing the effects of each factor on these four trials are 
summarized in Table 4. We will summarize the robust significant effect with the aid 
of graphical presentations in the following. 
Effect of endowment level, display of endowment and cooperation information. 
The significant Endow x Cooplnfo x Endowlnfo interaction is obtained on trials 2 
and 5, F (2, 233) = 4.06 for trial 2, and F (2, 233) - 5.83 for trial 5, p's < .05. Simple 
interaction analysis by the two endowment information conditions revealed that the 
Endow X Cooplnfo interaction was only significant when endowment information 
was displayed, F (2, 145) = 6.7 for trial 2, and F (2, 145) 二 11.21 for trial 5, p's < .05, 
and this interaction effect was not found when endowment information was absent. 
Further simple main effect analysis (under the displaying endowment 
information condition) shows that endowment has a significant impact on people's 
preference for others' endowment level both when cooperation information was 
displayed and not, F (2, 73) 二 6.78 for trial 2, and F (2, 73) = 8.92 for trial 5 when 
cooperation information was displayed; F (2, 72) = 49.14 for trial 2, and F (2, 72)= 
63.43 for trial 5 when cooperation information was not displayed, p's < .05. However, 
it can be noted from the larger F value when cooperation information was not 
displayed which implies that Endow x Cooplnfo interaction is stronger when 
cooperation information was not provided than when it was. The general main effect 
across the two cooperation-information conditions is that people of higher 
endowment preferred others with higher endowment as partners. But this is 
especially pronounced when cooperation information was absent, for example, Mehour 
=-1.222, M9hour 二 -.011, and M^hour =1.051 on trial 2.Thus, the effect of endowment 
on OtherEndow is conditional upon the absence of cooperation information but 
presence of endowment information. Figure 12 and 13 present the interaction pattern. 
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Figure 12 
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Table 4 Summary of Statistics of ANOVA Analysis on OtherEndow on Trials 1, 2’ 5, and 10 
- Source Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 5 Trial 10 
Endowment (Endow) 26.69* 15^8* 20.12* 16.87* 
Cooperation Information df 1 1 1 
(Cooplnfo) F - 0.03 0.00 0.48 
Endowment Information df 1 1 1 1 
(Endowlnfo) F 0.01 1.01 0.03 0.08 
Social Value Orientation df 1 1 1 1 
(SVO) F 0.01 0.35 1.8 0.54 
^ , . df 2 2 2 
Endow X Cooplnto p _ 4 98* 193* 8 14* 
^ df 2 2 2 2 
Endow X Endowlnfo p 33.27* 27.51* 53.21* 34.3* 
df 2 2 2 2 
Endow X SVO F 0.17 1.19 0.19 0.24 
Cooplnfo X Endowlnfo p^  . q.OS 0.04 0.66 
df 1 1 1 
Cooplnfo X SVO p - 155 o.73 0.16 
df 1 1 2 1 
Endowlnfo x SVO p ^ 25 0.09 5.83* 0.09 
Endow X Cooplnfo x df - 2 2 2 
Endowlnfo F - 4.06* 1.12 1.93 
df 2 1 2 
Endow X Cooplnfo x SVO p _ • 28 1 13 0 44 
df 2 2 2 2 
Endow X Endowlnfo x SVO p 026 148 I 24 036 
Cooplnfo X Endowlnfo x df 1 1 1 
SVO F - 0.2 6.85* 0.00 
Endow X Cooplnfo x df 2 2 2 
Endowlnfo x SVO F - 0.2 0.26 0.73 
df 245 233 233 217 
^ F (0.59) (0.57) (0.39) (0.45) 
*p < .05 (two-tailed). 
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Who Like Choosing Others with a Higher Cooperation Rate? 
Finally, we examined what the characteristics of the people who preferred 
others with higher cooperation rates. The four factors of the Endow, Cooplnfo, 
Endowlnfo, and SVO and their respective interactions were entered into the equation. 
Because OtherCoop is not applicable for trial 1, the results only included trial 2, 5, 
and 10. 
No significant effects were found consistently across the three trials. Only an 
Endow X Cooplnfo interaction was obtained on trial 2, F (2, 233) = 4.75, and a 
Cooplnfo X SVO interaction was significant on trial 5, F (1, 233) = 4.92, p's < .05. 
Because the two effects only appeared on a single trial and therefore are not 
consistent, we will not go through them in detail here. Detailed ANOVA results 
showing the effects of each factor on these three trials are summarized in Table 5. 
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Table 5 Summary of Statistics of AN OVA Analysis on Other Coop on Trials 2, 5, and 10 
‘ Source Trial 2 Trial 5 Trial 10 
Endowment (Endow) f o.52 L14 1.64 
Cooperation Information df 1 1 1 
(Cooplnfo) F 0.09 0.01 0.35 
Endowment Information df 1 1 1 
(Endowlnfo) F 0.04 0.09 0.35 
Social Value Orientation df 1 1 1 
(SVO) F 0.36 3.39 1.55 
df 2 2 2 
Endow X Cooplnfo p 4 乃* 1 06 0.43 
df 2 2 2 
Endow X Endowlnfo p 1 q 1 66 
df 2 2 2 
Endow X SVO p 2.22 0.07 1.16 
Cooplnfo X Endowlnfo 言 q ^^ 0 07 001 
Cooplnfo X SVO ^ 1 34 4 92* 3.28 
Endowlnfo X SVO •丄今 3.35 0.01 
Endow X Cooplnfo x df 2 2 2 
Endowlnfo F 1.02 1.2 0.26 
df 2 2 2 
Endow X Cooplnfo x SVO p 0 52 0 43 0 81 
df 2 2 2 
Endow X Endowlnfo x SVO p • 59 q 1 24 
Cooplnfo X Endowlnfo x df 1 1 1 
SVO F 0.01 0.3 0.23 
Endow X Cooplnfo x df 2 2 2 
Endowlnfo x SVO F 0.51 0.19 0.22 
df 233 233 217 
^ ^ F (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
*p < .05 (two-tailed). 
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Chapter 4. Discussion 
The present study aims at exploring the selective play paradigm in a public 
goods dilemma. Only until recent years did researchers pay attention to the limited 
ecological validity of the traditional forced play paradigm. In fact, even previous 
studies related to selective play have mostly applied it to the two-person prisoners' 
dilemma games only. The present research demonstrated that the fully-fledged 
selective play paradigm allows us to examine both the cooperation level and group 
formation in a public goods dilemma. 
Cooperation Level 
Results of our study can be interpreted in the following ways. Stated in 
hypothesis 1, we expected prosocials to put more time on the project than the 
proselfs because they tend to be more cooperative than the latter group of people. 
This hypothesis is supported by our findings such that on both measures of actual 
and proportion of time, prosocials contributed more than proselfs did. 
The might-vs-morality hypothesis postulates that prosocials and proselfs differ 
in their perceptions of mixed-motive interaction (Liebrand, Jansen, Rijken, & Suhre 
1986; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988). Prosocials view social dilemma as a question 
of morality. One should cooperate because it is good and correct. On the contrary, 
proselfs perceive the game in terms of might and power. Therefore, cooperation is a 
sign of weakness and capitulation, whereas defection shows intelligence and control. 
With different interpretation on the act of contribution, it is natural for prosocials and 
proselfs to behave differently in social dilemma games. 
Consistent with the stipulation in hypothesis 2, an individual's endowment level 
was found to affect his/her cooperation level. This is indicated by the significant 
endowment effect on the actual amount once placed on the project. Specifically, 
individuals with higher endowment contributed more time than those with lower 
endowment. This is in line with previous findings that direct manipulation of 
endowment level has a strong effect on people's willingness to cooperate which is 
explained in terms of the perception of the degree of impact their contribution had on 
the provision of the good (e.g., Wit, Wilke, & Oppewal, 1992). 
The finding can be explained by the notion of criticality as suggested by past 
researchers (Rapoport, 1988). Because high endowment individuals have higher 
amount of resources, they feel that their contribution is more critical to the provision 
of the good for the group. As a result, they are more willing to contribute. 
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On the contrary, we found that these high endowment individuals contributed 
less on the proportion of time measure. Interestingly, past studies did not obtain such 
a difference when the measure of proportion of time was used (Rapoport & Suleiman, 
1993; Wit, Wilke, & Oppewal, 1992; Van Dijk & Wilke, 1995). They justified the 
results of similar proportion of time contributed by people of different endowment 
levels with the equity theory (Adams, 1963). The equity theory is interpreted in the 
way that the degree of perceived fairness is determined by the value of the public 
good plus either the costs or bonuses obtained over contribution. In past research, the 
effect of perception of fairness on cooperation level was studied by inducing 
asymmetric endowments to the participants (Joireman, Kuhlman, & Okuda, 1994). 
Perception of unfairness about the reward allocation method was found to affect 
one's behavior (Leventhal, 1976, 1980). When resource asymmetries are based on 
external factors, e.g. experimental manipulation, like the one in our experiment, then 
participants are likely to feel that this is inequitable and thus will try to restore equity 
by differing their amount of contribution based on endowment level. More precisely, 
low endowment individuals would contribute less in order to compensate for the 
little resource that they were given. However, high endowment individuals would 
contribute more in order to match with the more resource that they received. In this 
way, the proportion of resource contributed becomes similar for the two groups of 
people. 
We may provide a potential explanation for the surprising finding here. 
Proportionally, low endowment individuals contributed more as we include the 
selection of partners in the experiment. Because in some sessions one's cooperation 
rate was displayed, the low endowment individuals may try to increase their 
popularity to be chosen by boosting the cooperation rate to be higher than the others 
which led to the present finding. In fact, this conjecture is prompted by the 
significant interaction between endowment level and the display of cooperation 
information which was obtained only when endowment information was provided. 
Specifically, the linear decrease in cooperation level when people had higher 
endowment level was found only when cooperation information was displayed. This 
is the “to attract others" strategy they used in the experiment. 
Moreover, as mentioned in the introduction section, Rapopport (1988) has 
suggested people with higher endowment are less motivated to contribute more 
because they have the least to gain from the outcome while the lower endowment 
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individuals are more motivated because they have the most to gain from it. This 
proposition helps explain the results we have got for the ProportionTime measure. 
The above finding also draws our attention to how cooperation level should be 
defined. With the implications drawn from the equity theory, people should 
contribute proportionally similar regardless of their endowment level. So, high 
endowment individuals should contribute more and low endowment individual less 
in relation to the actual amount of contribution. In fact, this is usually how we 
measure cooperation level in social dilemma games. However, our study found that 
this line of reasoning may not be able to account for all PG games. The two measures 
of actual and proportion amount can give us different pictures of the data and it 
therefore relies heavily on researchers' definition of cooperation level to determine 
what conclusion is drawn. The paradox is to be addressed because the present study 
is only one of the few which obtained such unexpected result. 
Our third hypothesis expecting prosocials with higher endowment to have a 
higher cooperation level while proselfs' cooperation level would not be affected by 
their endowment level is not supported because we did not obtain a significant 
interaction between endowment and SVO. Specifically, we found that the 
endowment effect on both prosocials and proselfs is similar. People with higher 
endowment generally contributed more in our experiment, while prosocials generally 
contributed more than proselfs did, with regard to the actual amount measure. We 
can attribute this to the strong effect of endowment level on people's behavior where 
it operates in similar ways for both prosocials and proselfs. 
For the effect of the kind of information displayed to people, we confirmed that 
displaying one's cooperation rate is crucial for inducing cooperation. When 
cooperation rate was displayed, people were more cooperative than if it was not. This 
is reasonable because when people can discern your cooperative tendency, they can 
decide whether they want to group with you based on this information. Conversely, if 
your past cooperation rate is unknown to others, you will not be afraid of the 
negative consequence of defection on the likelihood of being chosen by others and 
thus feel at ease to free-ride. 
The unexpected result here is that the display of endowment information has a 
significant, but negative impact on people's cooperation level. When people's 
endowment level was known to others, they contributed less than if it was not. Both 
high and low endowment individuals were similarly affected by the endowment 
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information effect but the underlying psychological processes might be different. For 
low endowment individuals, they might feel that as their low endowment level was 
publicized, people would not choose them anyway，therefore they contributed less. 
Furthermore, the display of endowment information may unleash reactance from the 
low endowment individuals. Specifically, these low endowment individuals may 
have inferred that revelation of their endowment level was an attempt to shame them 
into being cooperative and they reacted negatively to this. On the other hand, the 
high endowment individuals might feel that because people would choose them 
based on their high amount of resources available, they did not need to maintain a 
high cooperation rate to attract the others. 
This finding also gives us some insights on the relation between the kind of 
information displayed and the general cooperation level. If we are displaying a 
cooperation-related kind of information in the game, it can help promote higher 
contribution among people. However, if we are displaying other information, like 
endowment level, this will distract the effect of displaying cooperation rate and can 
even have a reverse effect on cooperation level because there are other factors 
affecting one's potential contribution other than cooperation rate. 
The interaction effect of Endowment level x Display of cooperation information 
X Display of endowment information was only obtained on the proportion of time 
measure. Interestingly, the predicted Display of cooperation information x Display of 
endowment information interaction is significant only in the low endowment group, 
i.e. those with six hours. Specifically, in this endowment group, the display of 
endowment information had no effect on cooperation level when cooperation 
information was absent. On the other hand, displaying endowment information 
would lower cooperation level when cooperation information was also displayed. 
When no information about others' past contribution is available, whether 
having information on others' endowment level should not have an effect on one's 
cooperation level. However, when we can have access to others' cooperation history, 
whether there is also the endowment information should have some impact. In 
particular, when people only know about others' cooperation rate, they will focus on 
that to choose their partners. As a result, all players will try to boost their cooperation 
rate and this in turns lead to a generally higher cooperation level. On the other hand, 
if one can know about others' cooperation rate as well as their endowment, they may 
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pay attention to both kinds of information. Imagine that if a person has a moderate 
cooperation rate but high endowment level, you will still consider him/her as a 
partner in the both information displayed condition. But if you don't have 
information about this person's endowment level (just as in the no endowment 
information but have cooperation information condition), you may be less likely to 
choose this person given the moderate cooperation rate. In this way, cooperation rate 
is not the solely important criteria for choosing partners in the both information 
available condition and thus the cooperation level is lower than that of displaying 
cooperation information only condition. 
It is uncertain why this Display of cooperation information x Display of 
endowment information interaction was found only in the low endowment group but 
not the two higher endowment groups. One plausible reason may be that displaying 
endowment information prompted people towards choosing the higher endowment 
individuals. This awareness about others' endowment information has particularly 
negative impact on those with higher amount of resources to contribute 
proportionally less. 
Choice of Partners 
Our study is a preliminary attempt to explore people's partner selection criteria 
in the fully-fledged selective play paradigm in a public goods dilemma. The three 
dependent measures on choice of partners (i.e., MeanLink, OtherEndow, and 
OtherCoop) provide us with different perspectives to examine partner selection. 
What Makes A Person Popular? With the MeanLink measure, we could 
examine whether an individual's endowment level and cooperation rate as well as the 
kind of information displayed would affect his/her popularity as a partner in the 
project. 
Concerning the interaction of Cooperation rate x Display of cooperation 
information x Display of endowment information, it was shown that when 
endowment information was not displayed, cooperators were much more likely than 
defectors to be selected by others when cooperation information was displayed than 
not. This is also consistent with our H5's prediction. Frank, Gilovich & Regan (1993) 
suggested that if identifiable, people would choose those who cooperate more as 
partners instead of those who do not. When endowment information was displayed, 
the differential preference for cooperators became much less apparent. It may be 
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interpreted as the stronger influence by endowment information than the cooperation 
information. It is because the strong influence on choice of partner by cooperation 
information is conditioned on the absence of endowment information. Once 
endowment information was provided, the effect of cooperation information was 
weakened. On the other hand, we did not obtain a similar finding for that of 
endowment information. As a result, we may say that comparing the two kinds of 
information in our study, the endowment level information has an overshadowing 
impact on people's selection of partners. Yet, we should note that it does not mean 
that cooperation information is not useful because it was shown that generally 
cooperators were more likely to be chosen as partners only when cooperation 
information was displayed. This three-way interaction is still a robust finding as it 
was found on trials 2 and 5, though not on trial 10. 
The significant interaction effect of Endowment level x Display of endowment 
information tells us that high endowment individuals were more likely to be chosen 
as partners when endowment information was displayed. This finding is consistent 
with the stipulation in H6. This is a robust finding because it was found in all the 
four trials that we analyzed. High endowment individuals are popular to be chosen as 
partners because they have higher potential to contribute. For example, even if a 
12-hour (high endowment) individual contributes one-third of his time, it is already 
more than half that a 6-hour (low endowment) individual can contribute. Therefore, 
higher endowment individuals are more popular as partners, but only when their 
endowment level is known to others. 
Who Prefers Others With More Endowment? We have included one's own 
endowment level, the kind of displayed information, as well as SVO to see if they 
would affect one's preference for others' endowment level. 
For the interaction of Endowment level x Display of endowment information x 
Display of cooperation information, on the one hand, it was shown that when 
endowment information was not displayed, participants of the three levels of 
endowment did not differ in choosing people with higher or lower endowment, 
regardless of whether cooperation information was provided or not. On the other 
hand, when information of endowment was displayed, participants with higher 
endowment tended to be more likely than their lower endowment counterparts to 
choose partners with higher endowment. Yet, there is a further constraint here. In 
essence, the preference for high endowment individuals by higher endowment 
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individuals was found especially when cooperation information was not displayed 
than displayed. Generally, high endowment individuals would choose higher 
endowment individuals when they have access to endowment information. But when 
cooperation information was also displayed, they may pay attention to cooperation 
information as well. Specifically, they will choose the higher endowment individuals, 
but also those with higher cooperation rate. Thus, endowment is no longer the only 
information they relied on when choosing their group members. So, it simply 
suggests that when both kinds of information were displayed, the tendency for people 
with higher endowment to choose others with higher endowment was weakened than 
if only endowment information was displayed. This finding is quite consistent since 
it was present on trials 2 and 5, though not on trial 10. 
Hinds, Carley, Krackhardt, and Wholey (2000) suggested that people will use a 
person's ability to contribute to the task as a criterion when choosing group members 
in order to reduce uncertainty in an organization. In our experiment, people were 
more likely to choose people of high endowment as endowment level was found to 
be related to cooperation level. We can see that for the actual amount of time 
measure, high endowment individuals did contribute significantly more time to the 
project. Therefore, when endowment information was displayed, people of high 
endowment were especially likely to choose people of the same kind due to 
similarity reason. According to Lazarsfeld & Merton (1954), people who have 
similar attitudes, beliefs and personal characteristics tend to be attracted to each other. 
The phenomenon is called "homophily". The similarity of participants in the 
endowment of time in the present study may create one similarity among those who 
own higher endowment. Practically speaking, high endowment individuals could 
optimize their own gains for choosing those with more endowment. 
It may also be due to high endowment individuals' fear of exploitation by the 
low endowment individuals. The fear towards free-riders is also known as the 
“sucker effect" (Kerr, 1983; Orbell & Dawes, 1981). Comparing high and low 
endowment individuals, it is obvious that higher endowment people will have a 
greater fear of being taken advantaged of due to their larger amount of resources. As 
a result, they have a much stronger preference for high rather than low endowment 
individuals. The empirical study by Aquino, Steisel, and Kay (1992) found that 
"under conditions of high resource inequality, the desire to avoid the sucker role is 
the dominant motive for those with greater resources, whereas free riding due to 
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feelings of dispensability was the dominant motive for those with fewer resources" 
(p. 682). This may account for the result that when the endowment information is 
displayed, the higher the endowment one has, the stronger the preference for higher 
endowment partners. 
So, why didn't the low endowment individuals also strongly prefer to choose 
higher endowment people when endowment information was displayed (in order to 
free-ride on them in the experiment)? This may be probably because the low 
endowment individuals knew that when endowment information was publicized, 
high endowment individuals would not choose them and therefore did not waste their 
time to choose these people. 
Who Prefers to Partner With Cooperators? Finally, we have included one's own 
endowment level, the kind of displayed information, as well as SVO to see if they 
would affect one's preference for others' cooperation rate. Unfortunately, we did not 
obtain any consistent effects across the trials. Further studies could be conducted to 
explore more on this topic. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
In this study we adopted a coursework scenario with university students as 
participants, while this is to simulate a similar situation that they would encounter in 
everyday life. However, this is quite dissimilar from the typical PG games and it is 
uncertain how generalizable the findings of the current study are. In addition, the 
course evaluation for test (defection) and project (cooperation) take up half of the 
course grade. It is likely that these game parameters, such as the percentage of marks 
taken up by the respective assessment methods, may have a significant impact on 
how people will behave in the game. There has been considerable evidence in 
previous studies about the effect of reward structure on cooperation in prisoner's 
dilemma games (Komorita and Parks, 1994; Rapoport & Chammah, 1965; Steele, 
1967). Specifically, Schelling (1973) proposed a d/m parameter that represents the 
horizontal distance between the payoffs for the cooperation and defection choices. 
Similarly, Komorita (1976) proposed a K’ index that reflects the general level of 
cooperation depending on the game parameters. 
We have only examined in this study the effect of two kinds of information, i.e. 
cooperation information and endowment information. Future studies may examine 
whether other kinds of information related to the game will have effects on 
cooperation level and choice of partners. Even for cooperation information, there can 
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be different formulations for cooperation to be disclosed. For example, we can 
display the cooperation rate for the last trial or the last two trials. It can be further 
explored whether different manipulation on the display of cooperation rate will have 
an impact on people's cooperation level and/or choice of partners. One hint is 
provided by our data. Some of the effects related to display of cooperation rate 
ceased in the trial, including the interaction among the display cooperation and 
endowment information and cooperation rate in the MeanLink measure, and the 
interaction between the display of cooperation and endowment information and 
endowment in the OtherEndow measure. These null findings suggest a diminishing 
effect of cooperation rate towards later trials. Because an average cooperation rate 
was displayed, you can notice that the effect of any single decision in later trials will 
be lesser and lesser, unless some very extreme decision is made. Therefore, you can 
expect that cooperation rates will be highly similar after many trials and that 
information will cease to be diagnostic. If we use cooperation rates of the immediate 
past n trial we may find more consistent effects of cooperation information and 
cooperation rates across trials. 
In our study, we focused people's attention in the partner selection period on 
others' cooperation rate and/or endowment level; and we prevented people from 
identifying each other by a random assignment of an identity trial by trial. In future 
research, one's identity could remain across trials to examine if past relationship will 
affect the likelihood of future mutual selection. For example, if I have partnered with 
someone who has a moderate cooperation rate, will I continue to choose him/her or 
will I rather turn to others of a higher cooperation rate? This situation is a more 
accurate reflection in our daily situation. People's partner selection decision may not 
be purely based on utility-related factors such as endowment level or cooperation 
history of others, rather it may also be the affiliation gained in past interaction. 
Another aspect which is worth further exploration lies on people's strategies on 
choosing their partners and their later contribution decisions. For instance, 
researchers may examine whether people will adopt the Hit-and-run strategy, i.e. 
always choosing the cooperators as partners at the first few trials (until punished by 
mutual defection) and then immediately turn to others (rather than their old partners). 
Because our experiment randomly assigns a new identity to each participant trial by 
trial, it is not possible for us to pursue answer to this interesting question. 
Conclusion 
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The present study examined the effects of endowment level, the kind of 
information displayed, cooperation rate, SVO on cooperation level and choice of 
partners in a selective play public goods context. 
We found that consistent with previous findings, prosocials and people of higher 
endowment contributed more time to the group. But the higher endowment 
individuals contributed more only with the measure of actual amount of time; 
conversely, they contributed proportionally less compared with the low endowment 
individuals. This hints further study to determine the role of endowment on 
cooperation. 
Some new findings were provided by our study such that the role of displaying 
cooperation information was found to encourage cooperation while displaying 
endowment would bring the opposite effect. To promote cooperation, we may need 
to focus on publicizing people's past contribution behaviors. 
A key feature of our study is that we attempted to investigate people's selection 
strategy and the use of revealing certain kinds of information. We obtained the result 
that cooperators would be more likely to be chosen when cooperation information 
was displayed. Meanwhile, higher endowment individuals were more likely to be 
selected when endowment information was displayed. People of higher endowment 
were also likely to choose higher endowment individuals, probably because of the 
fear of sucker effect. Interestingly, endowment information seems to be more 
influential on people's partner selection compared with cooperation information. 
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Appendix A 
Decomposed Game Questionnaire 
參與者編號： 











I A 丨 B I C 
你所得的分數 500 “ 500 550 
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請分別在1-9題中’圈出你認爲最合意的選擇： 
例如: 
/ A \ I B C 
你 所 得 的 分 ~ 60 - 70 80 
-對方所得的分數 I 70 I 80 
第 1題 
I A I B I C 
你所得的分數 480 _ 540 480 
—對方所得的分數 80 280 480 
第 2題 
I A I B I C 
你所得的分數 560 — 500 500 
—對方所得的分數 300 500 100 
第 3題 
I A I B I C 
你所得的分數 520 — 520 一 580 
一對方所得的分數 520 120 320 -
第 4題 
I A I B I C 
你所得的分數 500 560 490 
-對方所得的分數 100 300 490 -
第 5題 
I A I B I C 一 
你所得的分數 560 500 490 
“對方所得的分數 300 500 90 
第 6題 
I A I B I C _ 
你所得的分數 500 500 570 
“對方所得的分數 500 100 300 
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第 7題 ^ , 
一 I A I B I C 
你所得的分數 510 560 510 
對方所得的分數 510 300 110 
第 8題 , 
I A 丨 B I C 
你所得的分數 550 500 • 
對方所得的分數 300 100 500 
第 9題 
一 I A I B I C 
你所得的分數 480 490 • 
對方所得的分數 100 490 300 
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Appendix C 
Informed Consent Form 
Consent form 
The research that you will be participating in today is part of a Chinese 
University of Hong Kong, Department of Psychology project conducted by Professor 
Winton Au and Ms. Fion Law. It aims at investigating people's decision-making and 
group formation processes. It takes the form of an experiment which will last for 
about an hour and fifteen minutes. Your signature on this form indicates that your 
participation in our project is voluntary. You may withdraw from participation at any 
time, but then you will not receive the participation payment of $50. 
All information obtained in the course of this experiment will be used for 
research purposes only and personal information be protected and kept confidential. 
If you have further questions, please address them to the experimenter or call 
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Appendix D 
Debriefing Form 
Public Good Dilemma in the Selective Play Paradigm 
Debriefing Form 
Social dilemma is the conflict between maximizing personal interests and 
maximizing collective interests (e.g. Komorita, Parks, & Hulbert, 1992). One typical 
example is a public good. It is a product or service that can be consumed by members 
of a group, and its provision is almost entirely dependent on contributions by its 
group members. This type of social dilemma provides important insights for social 
interaction and policy planning. 
Past research mostly focused on a forced choice paradigm in social dilemmas. 
In this paradigm, people are locked in a group such that they have no choice for 
whom they would work with. In fact, we can normally select friends, lovers, 
co-workers and so on in our daily life. A more realistic paradigm, the selective play 
paradigm, appeared in recent years (e.g. Hayashi & Yamagishi, 1998). It allows 
people to choose whom they will work with and is a more realistic reflection of daily 
life interaction. 
It has been found that social value orientation (SVO) and endowment are crucial 
variables in affecting people's choice between cooperation and defection in a social 
dilemma. In the present study, a project scenario is used to illustrate the two 
variables' effect on people's cooperation level and choice of partners in a selective 
play paradigm. 
Participants were divided into two groups that some of them have 6 hours for 
the coursework each week while others have 9 or 12 hours in each week. It is 
proposed that people who have higher endowment are more likely to contribute for 
the group project. 
On the other hand, social value orientation means people's tendency to 
cooperate. Previous literature suggested that prosocials are more likely to contribute 
than proselfs. For example, those who are more willing to spend longer hours for the 
group project consistently are the so-called prosocials. 
If you are interested in this area of research, please consult the following 
references: 
Hayashi, N., & Yamagishi, T. (1998). Selective play: Choosing partners in an 
uncertain world. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 2, 276-289. 
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Komorita, S. S., Parks, C. D.，& Hulbert, L. G. (1992). Reciprocity and the induction 
of cooperation in social dilemmas. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 62, 607-617. 
If you have any questions about this study, please feel free to contact the project 
investigators: 
Dr. Winton Au Wing Tung (wintonau@cuhk.edu.hk) 
Ms. Fion Law Yin Kwan (fyklaw@psy.cuhk.edu.hk) 
Department of Psychology 
The Chinese University of Hong Kong 
Thank you again for participating in this experiment. As we are still collecting 
data at the moment, please do not discuss any aspects of the present research with 
others until February 2006 when the study is completed. 
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